HOME AND NATIVE LAND

WRITTEN BY SOME of the foremost critical thinkers and activists on issues of difference, diversity, and Canadian policy, Home and Native Land challenges sediments thinking on the subject of multiculturalism. This collection forges new and innovative connections by examining how multiculturalism relates to issues of migration, security, labour, environment/nature, and land. It illustrates the continued power, limitations, and, at times, destructiveness of multiculturalism, both as policy and as discourse.

With “multiculturalism”—in its official and popular forms—having become hotly contested in the post-9/11 world, the practices this discourse engenders will be the site of intense struggles over the meaning of race, diversity, terror, and poverty. Drawing attention to the critical role multiculturalism has played in the global rise of neo-liberalism, this book provides valuable insights into some of the most controversial debates that are set to shape the foreseeable future.

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HOME AND NATIVE LAND

Unsettling Multiculturalism in Canada

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Canadian multiculturalism and its nationalisms

Nandita Sharma

In Canada, we tend to think of the discourse of multiculturalism as uniquely ours, particularly since the Canadian state was the first to proclaim a policy of multiculturalism in 1971. However, it is important to note the roots of at least some aspects of multicultural discursive practice in the United States. So far, federal state officials there have chosen not to implement a policy concerning the matter, however, the discourse, and even the everyday practice, of multiculturalism is quite commonplace and in some important ways has influenced the trope of multiculturalism north of the border. In particular, the hegemonic association between immigration and multiculturalism and the related discourse that posits that all non-Natives are immigrants has spurred at least two developments that are evident in Canada.

First, in the period following the removal of legal exclusions against the immigration of various negatively racialized groups to Canada in 1967, multiculturalism borrowed from the American discourse of “we are all immigrants.” This ideologically levelled the very real disparities between those mostly non-white persons who were consigned as “new” immigrants and the still-dominant white majority. By articulating the notion of a new, post-racist Canada, the discourse of multiculturalism sidestepped non-white persons’ ongoing experience of racism. Secondly, the discourse of “we are all immigrants,” by more-or-less writing those constituted as Native out of the dominant discourse of the contemporary Canadian nation, reconstituted prior colonial state identities in which distinctions were made among colonizers (those in charge), Natives, and immigrants. Ironically, the uncritical acceptance of the official discourse of “we are all immigrants” by some who had been constituted as Natives helped unleash a neo-racist reaction. Within Native nationalisms, the trope of “we are (almost) all immi-
grants" was transformed to "all non-Natives are colonizers" so that even those who came to Canada as a result of colonial activities elsewhere and who were placed in subordinate positions within the new Canadian national society, have come to be portrayed as colonizers simply because they are non-Natives. Not only has the discourse of multiculturalism produced a revamped "Canadian" identity, then, it has also given greater life to an "indigenous" identity, particularly in its binary manifestation of Native/non-Native.

By mobilizing both of these discursive shifts, multiculturalism constitutes a double ideological move. First, it legitimizes a discourse that obliterates any distinction between colonizers and immigrants, thereby depoliticizing the process of constructing a racialized Canadian nation-state through colonial practices. Secondly, the shifts that official multicultural discourse precipitated have paved the way for the conflation of processes of colonization with those of migration. Multiculturalism, then, has changed our understanding of Canadian nation-state building from an activity embedded within various imperialist projects (i.e., British and French) to a state-centric discourse in which colonizers become immigrants, immigrants become colonizers, and only Natives belong. This chapter questions these discursive practices, which are deeply embedded not only within previous colonial state practices of differential belonging but also within contemporary neo-liberal forms of capitalist globalization. It calls for a rejection of racialized, nationalized, and capitalist understandings of land and people and the relationships among them and challenges the sovereignty story with the naturalization of xenophobia that comprises Canadian multiculturalism.

Are we all immigrants?

Let us begin with the discursive origins of the hegemonic notion that, in Canada, "we are all immigrants," a notion that is most closely associated with the 1951 publication of Oscar Handlin's *The Uprooted*, which claimed that the United States was an "immigrant nation." John F. Kennedy's posthumously published *A Nation of Immigrants* (1964) cemented this notion as part of the dominant American ideology of nationhood during key moments in the anti-racist civil rights struggles, particularly in demands for change in the "racial contract," which privileged whites. The idea that every non-Native was an immigrant, along with claims that the civil rights victories of the mid- to late-1960s eliminated racism from the operation of state and market, set the tone for how national multiculturalism policies have come to be represented around the world.

However, it is important to note that an even earlier example of multiculturalist discourse can be seen in Walt Whitman's 1855 portrayal of the United States as a "teeming nation of nations." This shows that white settler societies, such as the United States or Canada, have long used the liberal discourse of multiculturalism as a practical measure to bridge the ideological gap between the racialization of national membership and the labour demands of employers for ways to cheapen labour, including the use of state racism. In Whitman's case, the strategy of incorporating negatively racialized groups into the nation was a response to criticisms that the U.S. was failing to live up to the qualities of democracy, equality, and individual liberty through which it defined itself (and was defined by other imperialists).  

Whitman's representation of the United States as a "teeming nation of nations" acknowledged the reality of America's multiple racialized groups in a way that neutralized the power relations underlying their forced relationships of inequality. By pushing aside the historical conditions that allowed for the emergence of the United States (and the co-optation of the truly revolutionary intent of many fighting against the British Empire), Whitman's representation flattened the divisions and inequalities that characterized racist social relations in the United States. Later, Oscar Handlin's consideration of everyone (other than those constituted as Native) as a "stranger in the land," along with Kennedy's depiction of the United States as "a nation of immigrants" (again, except Natives), moved away from Whitman's narrative of a multi-national United States to one that portrayed Europeans as the original immigrants. This too worked to deny the racist hierarchy established by elite Europeans in the United States. However, it also insidiously denied the violent colonization of the territories claimed by the United States by rendering colonialism as just another instance of human migration. By discursively placing immigration, rather than colonization, at the centre of the United States' nation-making project — indeed, by turning colonialism into a form of migration — such ideological representations helped to both disavow the violence of colonialism and to produce the liberal myth of an America that welcomes immigrants instead of a spatial, legal formation that recruited successive groups of migrants in order to exploit their labour in the service of expanding the power of the state and the profits of capitalists.

The shift from seeing elite Europeans as colonizers to seeing all non-Natives as immigrants was crucially important in that it obfuscated...
the very different ways in which various groups of people came to land in the United States. An astonishing example of this amnesiac relationship with the history of migration is displayed in President Kennedy's recasting of enslaved Black as "immigrants from Africa." The discursive shift to "we are (almost) all immigrants" also helped to ideologically neutralize the variously racialized groups were accorded very different economic, political, and social standings in the American body politic.

In particular, the differential access to, at first, United States citizenship, and later, legal entry to the United States after the establishment of border controls is wholly disavowed. No mention is made of the fact that the first United States Act pertaining to citizenship, the 1790 Naturalization Act, restricted citizenship to those "aliens" who were "free white persons of good character," or that the federal law establishing immigration controls worked to bar the entry of negatively racialized migrants from China. The discursive shift to "we are (almost) all immigrants" also steered discussion away from the reliance that elites (and later non-elites who were constituted as "white") had on the economic and cultural consequences of the United States' racialized politics of differentiating groups of "immigrants" and of homogenizing the colonially defined "Natives."

The trope that Europeans were simply the original immigrants prefigured in interesting ways the current discourse on the status of minorities. This representation of Europeans as the first immigrants dehistoricized and depoliticized the relative material success of various migrants from Europe. By failing to account for how "whites" were granted relatively privileged access to citizenship, migration, free land, the policy, and racialized ideas of societal belonging, this new discourse helped to consolidate the ideology of meritocracy (i.e., the American Dream) in the relationship between migration and class mobility in the United States.

Most importantly, the shift from an unabashed celebration of colonization to the discourse of "the colonizers too are immigrants" mobilized the ideology of an original American plurality, the touchstone of the contemporary rhetoric of multiculturalism. The discursive shift from legitimated ideas of stratified national belonging to a portrayal of the United States as having always been a liberal plurality was a disavowal of the violence of expropriation, genocide, and exploitation. It was also a disavowal of the many-layered discriminatory practices against "Natives" and "insalubrable" migrants. Moreover, multiculturalism became a way to maintain the ongoing power of racism in organizing the policy by minimizing claims of continued racism by non-whites. Kennedy's mobilization of the discourse of a multicultural plurality where everyone was on the same footing (a "nation of immigrants") was important therefore not only for how it reframed social relations but also for how it helped to neutralize both the United States' brutally racist past as well as the racism that continued in his day.

This depiction of the United States as a "nation of immigrants" is also part of a broader shift in racist discourses since the 1980s and 1990s that has ushered in new racisms. Central to these new racisms was the deployment of the ethnicity paradigm, a paradigm that, as Michael Omi and Howard Winant have pointed out, ignores continuing processes of racial formation and racism in the United States, and discours the relationship of these processes to neo-liberal restructuring of the global capitalist system. The ethnicity paradigm carries an essentialized, static, and separationist view of culture with the cultural attributes of racialized discourses, such as language, "ethnic" dress, "ethnic" customs, and "ethnic" traditions.

Such culturalist views complement the discourse of multiculturalism, as each portrays ethnicities/cultures as existing (unchangingly) in utter isolation from all others while deflecting attention from the process of racialization that is embedded within racial formations. Thus, the refusal to recognize the diasporic spaces and transnational cultures that were created through centuries of encounters, not only in the United States but around the world, was transported wholesale into the discourse of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, with its focus on ethnicity and its impoverished notion of "culture," was productive of neo-racist notions of highly racialized relationships between people and place. Indeed it can be said that a discourse of multiculturalism is a neo-racist discourse par excellence.

The shift from valorizing "whites" as colonizers to privileging "whites" in the process of immigration, and the shift from a discourse of "race" to one of ethnicity/culture were ideologically useful in concealing the economic and political basis for the United States' immigration reforms of 1965. Even as the United States co-opted the most militant of anti-racist demands, reconfigured its geopolitical strategy towards the nominally decolonized and independent national states of the Third World, and recognized the need to expand its criteria for immigration in order to compete with other "Western" societies for much-needed (im)migrant labour, its 1965 changes were ideologically represented as a repudiation of a racist past and, with no hint of irony, conversely as a continuation of the long history of American hospitality towards newcomers. Canadian reform of racialized immigration
policies and its racialized polity took place within this broader discursive/material frame and borrowed much from it. The absence of an official federal state policy of multiculturalism in the United States should not, therefore, blind us to the influence of the U.S. on Canadian debates about immigration and the emergence of Canada's discourse on multiculturalism.

**Multiculturalism as a neo-liberal mode of belonging**

As in the United States, it was, in part, the activities of anti-racist movements in Canada and nationalist independence movements against imperialism in the Third World that created pressure for the Canadian state to eliminate overt statements about preferring certain races and nationalities in its admission criteria for immigrants (i.e., in the selection of those admitted to Canada as permanent residents). This resulted in the extension of the right for professional non-whites and their nuclear families to apply for permanent residency in Canada and a greater recognition of non-whites within Canada. Both of these are significant developments in the history of non-white migration to Canada.

Yet, the fact that these developments also took place when capitalist enterprises, in general, were grappling with falling profits has been widely ignored. As technological advances in communication and transportation made it easier to shift more sites of production away from sites of consumption, many capitalists, aiming to lower operating costs, relocated their investments to territories where labour costs, as well as the other costs of doing business, such as environmental and labour laws or taxes, were much lower. This led Canadian state officials to try to make Canada more competitive as a site for capital investment. Acknowledging the context of these simultaneous and significantly overlapping social, economic and political developments helps make sense of the move to represent the Canadian polity as multicultural. At the same time, we must pay attention to the refashioning of nationalist discursive practices. The expression of nationalism at this time became better attuned to the increasingly global processes of capitalist expansion, often named as rootlessness. This idea of rootlessness posed significant problems, however, for much of the proletariat, which saw itself as being very much rooted in the nation. The discourse of multiculturalism, then, enabled a re-imagining of the Canadian people for new times and, as discussed above, for new racists.

Using Marx's insight that social organization is implicit in the organization of production, the simultaneous formation of new nationalized subjectivities for workers who understood themselves as operating within a Canadian society and new transnational subjectivities for those competing within a global capital market can be seen as part of the cultural effects of the global expansion of capitalism. Indeed, this is one of the conclusions that Ghassan Hage reaches in his study of Australian-style multiculturalism. He theorizes that white elites have mobilized multicultural discourses not only as a means of co-opting more transformative demands but also as part of their own self-identity as cosmopolitan whites with distinctively global tastes, outlooks, and, importantly, investments. In this sense, and especially when analyzed within the context of an expanding globalization of capitalist social relations, multiculturalism is best seen as both strategically useful and enriching to white elites as they come to imagine the space in which they—and their capital—operate as "global." In this sense, the representation of the polity as "multicultural" provides elites with a form of cultural capital that gives them an advantage in a world defined by increasing flows of capital, goods, and people. Elite whites' use of multicultural discourse that tolerates non-whites and includes them as members of the now supposedly non-racist nation is necessary in a world where support from non-white state leaders and officials is crucial.

The response against multiculturalism by those whites who were or are not in a material position to benefit from the further globalization of capital should be understood within this classed relationship. Since they have no capital to invest and, in fact, live in an increasingly precarious existence due to global shifts in production, white workers often respond with hostility to any efforts to embrace capitalist cosmopolitanism. Of course, what non-elite whites also feel is a challenge to their superiority in relation to non-whites of all classes. The threat, however, comes not only from the usual non-white suspects but also from an emerging elite of cosmopolitan whites who revel in the transnational world of business opportunities by refashioning themselves as cosmopolites enjoying the increased variety of songs, dances, and food that the presence of non-whites is best known for within the framework of multiculturalism. The sense of white, working class betrayal, then, is aimed at what is often seen as elite whites' collusion with non-whites to alter the "racial contract" that explicitly and concretely privileged the white working class in previous eras. Interestingly, this same discourse has also helped to create the sense that only white workers have been negatively affected by neo-liberal changes in investment and state practices. Non-whites are thus rendered invisible and are even perversely seen as neo-liberalism's main beneficiaries.
Indeed, the class-based support for multiculturalism has been obfuscated by the portrayal of multiculturalism as a response to racism and as a means of protecting non-whites primarily from the white working class. The problem of legitimizing the Canadian state's facilitation of neo-liberal reforms, reforms that privatized formerly public assets and services, deregulated environmental and labour regulations, and further liberalized world trade, was ideologically resolved by focusing on the supposed new racial/cultural openness of post-1967 Canadian society. Opening up sites for new capitalist investment was accompanied by the multiculturalist rhetoric of an opening up of whites to the presence of non-whites in their (national) midst.

Since multiculturalism represented a deflection of more radical anti-racist demands, the economic success of some non-whites in Canadian society was displayed as evidence for the state's claim to anti-racism. Non-whites were put forth as living proof of Canada's diversity, thus bolstering the image of Canada that state officials were presenting to the international arena of investors and potential migrants with professional qualifications. This opportunistic aspect of multiculturalism supports the prevalent sense among multiculturalism's critics that non-whites have simply been set on a national and international stage to perform an elaborate phantom of an anti-racist society that has never materialized.

Yet, however much globalization was on state officials' minds in the 1960s and 1970s, society was (and is) still imagined as national; it is therefore important to recognize multiculturalism as an attempt by the Canadian state to avert a crisis of legitimation— a crisis brought about, in part, by the expansion of state activities to include the management of the cyclical crises of capitalism. In the 1960s and 1970s, as the state increasingly took responsibility for ameliorating the effects of economic crises, it simultaneously expanded the social criteria for national membership while restricting legal avenues to joining the nationalized polity, particularly to those most devastated by neo-liberal state policies elsewhere and the related global scramble for new investment opportunities. The crisis of state legitimation was ultimately resolved through the mobilization of nationalist ideology and, most especially, the reconfiguring of Canadian immigration policy.

With the extension of permanent resident rights to non-whites in 1967 and the proclamation of multiculturalism policies in 1971, the promise of social equality and belonging for certain non-whites grew. Government acts at this time perpetuated the myth of Canada as a "just society" but did so precisely at a time when a major policy shift on immigration was being established. The new category of non-Canadian Others, also known as "non-immigrants" or "temporary foreign workers," comprised those excluded from the national citizenship that official "immigrants" (or "permanent residents") could now lay claim to. The categorization of the new Others as non-immigrants accomplished two things: their de jure exclusion from the civil rights of Canadian citizenship and, hence, the cheapening and weakening of their labour power, and their exclusion from the social meaning of being Canadian. In this way, not only was official multiculturalism a response to changing immigration policies, it also paved the way for new exclusions to be organized through immigration law.

Restricting the Canadian polity

Discussions of the 1967 reforms usually analyze the changes as an opening up of immigration to non-whites and, in a way, this is true. However, it is just as important to see these changes as resulting in other kinds of restrictions. Aside from the relatively small refugee admittance program, immigration (or permanent residence status) was restricted to a professional class of disproportionately male-gendered immigrants and, through their sponsorship, members of their nuclear families. This excluded—by law—those who didn't fit the new preferred immigrant characteristics. A wealth of literature has pointed out that even after the 1967 changes, racism continued to play a part in the state's process of immigration selection. However, middle-class cultural capital (or one's familial relationship to it), rather than how one had been racialized or which nationality one held, came to be a key determining category for permanent residency and hence a path to formal Canadian citizenship.

A far greater restriction was also imposed during this period. Along with the removal of the pre-1967 "preferred races and nations" immigration criteria, came another less-studied seismic shift in Canadian immigration policy. A mere six years following the 1967 reforms, the 1973 Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) was launched. The NIEAP, which continues today, is a regulatory aspect of Canadian immigration policy that both consolidates and expands many of the previous labour recruitment programs that positioned migrants as a temporary, unfree, labour force.

People recruited to work through the NIEAP are legally tied to a particular employer, a particular occupation, and therefore to a particular geographical location in Canada. They are unable to change any of the
conditions of their temporary employment authorization without the consent of immigration officials and without a new employer to whom they would also be tied. To varying degrees, they are denied access to social assistance programs, even though they directly pay into, such as old-age pensions and unemployment insurance, thereby subsidizing such programs for the citizenry. Significantly, my past research has shown that since the mid-1970s, the majority of people entering Canada to work were admitted as non-immigrant unskilled workers while only a minority came with the rights of permanent residency. In 2004, the proportion of workers granted permanent residency was 35 per cent while 65 per cent were admitted as “temporary foreign workers.”

For those classified as non-immigrant workers, the lack of labour market freedom, the inability to de-commoditize themselves through access to the social wage, and the restriction of their labour market choices has ensured that they are amongst the cheapest workers and most vulnerable persons in the country. Not surprisingly, the NIEAP was—and continues to be—very much driven by employers’ demands for a “flexible” and “competitive” workforce. This flexibility and competitiveness, however, is predicated on a legal denial of mobility and, therefore, a legal denial to actually compete in the labour market.

Such state practices of this managed migration approach highlight the inherent contradiction between the demands of capitalism and notions of plurality. The right of Canada (and every other national state) to discriminate against those deemed to be de jure non-members is integral to the very architecture of the contemporary global system of national states. National states, through the institutionalization (and considerable expansion) of the idea of “national sovereignty,” have claimed and gained the right in international law to determine national membership and therefore to determine who can and cannot cross into their claimed territories and to impose any number of restrictions against people who are admitted.

Consequently, in the making of immigration policy, national sovereignty rules. Within the realm of international law, people do not have the right to come to or live and work in Canada if they so choose (other than through the increasingly restricted right to seek asylum if a person fears persecution). In all cases, the state has the right to determine their status. Migration thus is seen to be a contract that the state has the power to more or less unilaterally revoke. Significantly, as Radhika Mongia shows, the Canadian state first claimed this right as a means of opposing the entry of early twentieth-century South Asian migrants as British subjects, despite the fact that these migrants had been assured by the British Crown that they were British as anyone else in the British Empire. In claiming that national sovereignty was a more important determinant of Canadian state policies than the nation’s privileged membership in the British Empire, the sovereignty of the Canadian state to determine its national membership came into being against the mobility rights of non-whites.

This aspect of sovereignty has allowed the Canadian state to discriminate against various racialized and nationalized groups of migrants in the past and presently. In the so-called post-civil rights era, the national sovereignty claim made it possible, in part, for states to reorganize nationalized labour markets along neo-liberal lines. By recruiting workers through managed-migration schemes, such as the NIEAP, or by severely restricting legal avenues to migration so that more and more people come as “illegals,” the state has ensured that the majority of migrants working in Canada lack most, if not all, of the rights associated with membership in the Canadian polity. Canadian immigration policies therefore need to be seen as an ideological device with enormous material consequences. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, the border is not just the physical boundary separating nationalized spaces but is a line of difference that authorizes the state to carry out practices against non-nationals that are unconstitutional and that are deemed unacceptable, undemocratic, and even manifestly unjust if carried out against citizens or permanent residents. Restrictive immigration policies, therefore, are less about restricting access to Canadian territory than about differentiating amongst those within it— all the while obfuscating the source of the differential inclusion of those workers legally classified as “foreigners.”

It is in such practices that we find one of the most important aspects of Canadianness—the continual construction of a negative duality between national subjects and foreigners that rationalist practices work to organize, and that immigration and citizenship policies operationalize. The experiences of those who live as foreigners in Canada are shaped by a constant denial of the social, political, and economic rights of citizenship, as well as a denial of their right to make themselves at home. The flip side of this nationalist scenario is that for those who are accorded the social and legal status of being Canadian, these denials often seem perfectly acceptable. Ideological practices of nationalism, which are never far from those of racism, as Étienne Balibar points out, need to be foregrounded in discussions of how subordination and exploitation have been reproduced through—not in opposition to—the more “inclusive” Canadian national polity and
national imaginary of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For this reason, it is important to go against both ideas of “race” and ideas of “nation,” and oppose the power of national states to enact such a “nation.”

Are all immigrants colonizers?

While there are several ways that national belonging is shaped by neoliberal practices, one is the racialization of culture. Culture, however, has arrived as a cadaver to the feast of Canadian multiculturalism. There are, of course, multiple cultures within Canada. What the idea of multiculturalism does, ironically, is to disavow the notion that we all share a single geopolitical space known as Canada, as well as a long past and present of countless encounters, interactions, and interdependencies. The idea of multiculturalism was and is an idea that presents each racialized community as having been born in splendid isolation from all others and each having a largely separate existence. The culture of multiculturalism imagines racialized cultures whose key epistemological frames are tradition and timelessness, and which are thus short of their dynamism and their socially constructed relational characteristics.

Multiculturalism, in short, has helped to produce a culture of neo-racism whereby the idea of ethnic culture has replaced the much discredited idea of race. Like past racisms, neo-racist culture also demands racial separation but organizes this through the supposedly tolerant view that each different culture or ethnic group is best valued when left on its own, with its own supposedly unique basis for social organization. In celebrating the tolerance of white Canadians for these so-called different people who, until recently, had been legal targets for discrimination, a new kind of racist understanding of Canada has been cemented. This is the neo-racist view that, along with continuing vertical hierarchies organized around the racialized duality of superior/inferior, there exist horizontally organized cultural differences. Neo-racist culture, especially after the maturation of neo-liberal policies in the late 1980s, has insisted that these different cultures are best kept apart in fundamental ways. This view has done little to dislodge the centrality of whiteness. Rather, it has insulated whiteness further by representing it as just another culture amongst many, instead of as an emblem of power and a form of dominance over Others.

At first blush, the argument that official multiculturalism as practiced in Canada is a form of neo-racism might seem contradictory. The common-sense understanding of multiculturalism is that differences amongst the polity are to be celebrated instead of condemned. However, the emphasis on cultural differences embedded within the discursive practices of multiculturalism need to be juxtaposed with the creation of material differences amongst people in Canada, particularly those that arose due to immigration status or ideas of national belonging. Remembering that, in no small part, multiculturalism has come to be a proxy for “dealing with immigrants,” the fact that the period of multiculturalism state policies in Canada is the same one that ushered in the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program needs to be taken into account.

That Canada became more open to some non-whites as citizens at the same time that its immigration policies became more restrictive is not a coincidence. Multiculturalism needs to be understood not only as the co-optation of anti-racist demands that it was, but also as a co-optation of some of the targets of racism into the nationalist logics of the Canadian state. As the discursive frame of “we are (almost) all immigrants” came to replace the more politically charged duality of “some of us are Canadian: Others are immigrants,” those who had been relegated to the category of immigrant could come to feel a greater sense of national belonging once (almost) everyone was recognized as such. Simultaneously, by re-identifying themselves as immigrants, white Canadians were able to understand colonialism as simply another wave of migration and the violence of colonialism as simply the byproduct of cultural encounters.

These double discursive shifts – the first being the shift in neo-racist discourses from race to ethnicity; the second being the existential shift of whites from colonizers to immigrants – allowed for the formation of a citizenship contract that by no means voided what Charles Mills has termed the “racial contract.” By embracing non-whites who held citizenship through their birth in Canada, or who had been admitted as permanent residents and therefore had legal access to citizenship, multiculturalism expanded the numbers of those who believed the Canadian state ruled on their behalf. This, in turn, helped to produce not only a changing body of national subjects but also a changing body of so-called foreigners whose subordination within the polity could be legitimated. Becoming legally and socially Canadian, particularly when the ability to do so was often class-based, produced a compact of citizens whereby those so classified could disregard the concerns of those who were classified not only as non-citizens but even as non-immigrants. While some within anti-racist movements clearly saw the subordination of non-immigrants as part of their struggle (the fight for the rights of domestic workers from the Caribbean...
and Asia is an important example of this), most assumed that their battle against the denial of citizenship was mostly over and therefore focused their energies on the needs of citizens and permanent residents, often in opposition to "foreigners."

Hence, the much-discussed shift in Canadian immigration policy in 1967 and the other, much less-discussed shift of 1973 that led to a program designed to expand the numbers of temporary, migrant workers, need to be seen as intimately tied to one another. Trudeau’s 1971 proclamation of a policy of multiculturalism spread the 1967 changes throughout Canadian society while simultaneously making way for the 1973 intensification of unfreedom for a growing population of new migrants, many of whom were non-whites from the Third World. Such intensification was driven both by employers, who advocated for the NIEAP, and the Canadian state, which was eager to meet their demands.

However, this is not the end of the story. The NIEAP has not caused much of a stir in Canadian society largely because those who are being subjugated through it are classified as "foreign workers" who supposedly bear no relationship to the Canadian policy. An anti-racist agenda worthy of its name must take into account how racism is often institutionalized through national practices that differentiate amongst those who are within Canada or the basis of their immigration and citizenship status. This line of thought is significant not only for our ability to challenge the exploitation of non-citizens and non-immigrants, but also for the much-heralded (and in some quarters, celebrated) claims of the “end of multiculturalism” some thirty years after its implementation, a discourse that further obfuscates both the history and current manifestations of racism in Canada.

Indeed, the “end of multiculturalism” rhetoric demonstrates the political maturation of neo-racist arguments. The racism that has come to be more prevalent than ever in the aftermath of 9/11 is a racism that insists that certain non-whites, particularly those who are, or who are perceived to be, Muslim, have a different culture. It is a racism that insists that these different cultures are incompatible with Canadian culture, and suggests that the mixing of cultures (or civilizations) is undesirable, leads to clashes, and, as such, is dangerous. This kind of racism, which is directed by the state especially against non-whites who are also non-citizens, is arguably even more virulent than in previous eras, when assimilation was seen as the cure for difference. Now that many people across the political spectrum view (ethnic) culture as an essential characteristic of self, the re-energized political project of nationalism demands not only that ethnic culture be recognized, but also that each ethnic culture have its own place in the world in the form of its own land base and political community. This is certainly the case in Canada where some white Canadians are reasserting the end of tolerance for Others and their different, supposedly incompatible, and incommunicable cultures. Importantly, the discourse of the end of multiculturalism signals a reinvigoration of anti-immigrant discourses, since “true” Canadians are once again being constituted as “not immigrants.”

These neo-racist arguments are not limited to whites who imagine Canada as exclusively their, however. It is also evident in some claims of Indigenous sovereignty whereby only those constituted as “Natives” are seen to belong in the plethora of Native nations that are said to comprise Canada. Indeed, there are an increasing number of scholars and activists who argue that all non-Natives, including those who came to Canada because of their own experiences of colonialism or who were brought here as slaves, indentured labourers, refugees, or contemporary migrant workers, are settler-colonizers. This trope confuses and wholly conflates processes of migration with those of colonialism, such that the only decolonization possible is one where everyone lives in their own “Native land” or where all non-Natives are subordinated members of newly sovereign Native polities.

This argument is heavily indebted to the racialization and nationalization of place. In particular, it reproduces colonial state practices of differentiating between Natives and non-Natives. Arguments for the sovereignty of Native national subjects transform the claim that “we are (almost) all immigrants,” which conflates colonization with migration, to “all immigrants are colonizers,” which conflates all migration to a mode of colonization. By this logic, the migrations of those constituted as Native are wholly denied (indeed the discussion of Natives having migrated is sometimes seen as a colonizing narrative as well) while the colonization of migrants is roundly rejected as a basis for a shared sense of “we-ness.”

Thus, thirty years after the start of official multiculturalism, we see a proliferation of discourses that rely on the distinction between national subjects and foreigners. In the aftermath of 9/11, citizenship (or rather the absence of it) has been used to target specific groups of people. Indeed, the main way that the Canadian state has shown its support for the U.S.-led “war on terror” has been to target non-citizens for coercive actions in the name of securing the national space. Whether in the form of Canada’s participation in U.S. practices of “extraordinary rendition” to torture, or in the issuance of national security
certificates that allow the indefinite incarceration of non-citizens (and only non-citizens) without habeas corpus and other common rights of due process, or in the targeting of non-citizens in immigration raids in schools, homes, and workplaces for minor infractions of immigration law, the punishment of non-citizens has become the main way that the state performs its concern for citizens. At the same time, those classified as (im)migrants to Canada are now seen as colonizers for their act of crossing national borders. Their mobility has thus come to be a central problem for both white Canadian and native nationalism.

Hence, to more completely understand the legitimization of exploitation in Canada, we must not only take into account how anti-racist struggles in Canada have tried to incorporate various subordinated groups into the Canadian polity, we also need to challenge sovereignty stories of all sorts — stories that insist upon there being a coincidence of identity, territory, and authority. This claim to sovereignty by the Canadian state forms the basis for legalised discrimination against those deemed to be foreigners, a category that has, throughout modern history, been used to differently include the Other, rather than simply exclude her or him. This claim to sovereignty also legitimates a racialized and ethnocized claim to land and to power.

Our struggles for decolonization must take great care not to merely mimic these sovereignty arguments or simply turn the binary identities imposed upon us on their head to agitate for a nation and a national state of our own. The liberatory (as opposed to nationalist) call, therefore, is a call for a “line of flight” away from ruling ideas and ruling processes of national identifications and towards the ethical-political reconstruction of what has been called the “multitude” or the “medley crew.” The multitude is, as Sergio Fiedler puts it, “the trauma of bourgeois society.” Its basis of solidarity is fluid. “Fluid solidarities,” according to Mohammed A. Bamyeh, are “perspectively fragmented” and subject to self-reflexive revision. Consequently, the multitude was in the past, and is still, capable of forming new social relationships based on cooperation through and against existing national borders and racialized communities. The power of the multitude thus lies in its democratic potential — its ability, if exercised, to refuse to succumb to the homogenizing dimensions of the state’s transcendent, sovereign power that relies on nefarious projects of identification.

What is at stake is the creation of other forms of identities in which it is not possible to depict some people as foreign. As Chantal Mouffe argues, this will “involve constructing other forms of identity which are going to make people change their perceptions” towards those whose exploitation is legitimated through ideas of national Otherness. Without opposing hegemonic understandings of society as national, we will not be able to make much of a difference in the lives of the so-called foreigners — the Others of modernity — who, in the neo-liberal era of neo-racism, are seen as the quintessential menace to national subjects everywhere.

One step towards challenging the almost-universal political legitimacy of national states and their sovereign right to determine national membership is being taken by No Borders movements and their call for two interconnected, contemporary common rights for every human being: the power to stay, or to prevent one’s displacement and dispossession, and the power to move. In working for a world where people are neither defined by their historical relationship to particular places nor are expected to have a static sense of home, No Border movements are redefining the terrain of society itself, and taking a necessary first step in the re-imagining of political community that goes beyond the difference-creating violence of nationalisms of the colonizers or the colonized.

Chapter 5: Canadian multiculturalism and its nationalisms

11. I am indebted to Slavoj Žižek (1997) and the title he gave to his discussion of similar processes. However, Žižek discusses “the cultural logic of multinational capitalism,” my analysis is more attuned to the centuries-long historical process of “multinational capitalism” and I am, therefore, more interested in how neoliberalism is a process that is profoundly reliant on shifting discourses of national state power within the context of an almost universal existence capitalist social relations. See Slavoj Žižek, “Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” New Left Review 225 (1997) pp. 28–51.
13. In Hage’s White Nation, he discusses this process in Australia, notably, another “White settler” society that has both mobilized a discourse of multiculturalism as well as institutionalized it in state policy.

Chapter 6: Multiculturalism already unbound

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Notes to pages 94–101

19. Sharma, "Race, Class and Gender," and Sharma, Home Economics.
24. In Home Economics, I discuss how the two policy initiatives (1957 and 1973) and also related through a moral panic against the extension of permanent residency (and its associated rights) to non-white immigrants, see especially Chapters 4 and 5.